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ABSTRACT
The complex interrelationships among offensive, defensive,
strategic, tactical, etc. weapon systems and the high cost of
research and development, initial procurement, maintenance and
operation of today's and the future's weapon complexes have forced
decisionmakers to utilize the system analysis or cost-effective-
ness approach. One educational device that is used to illustrate
the principles of and the need for "Cost-Effectiveness" and "System
»
Analysis" is a simulated military planning game. This paper
developes several game form analytical models that can be solved
by linear programming techniques. The objective is to use an
analytical tool to illustrate and emphasize the impact and signi-
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In the past, the choice among weapons was a somewhat isolated
procurement decision. However, today the choices and the problems
of military planning have become highly interconnected. This is
a direct result ef the rapid changes in technology and greater
system complexity. Total cost and related time stream, lead-time
and uncertainty factors in the R&D, procurement and operational
phases add their impact. A weapon 1 s dependence upon ether weapons
and supporting systems within the same service and in other services
must be carefully considered by a decisionmaker. Thus systems
analysis, cost-effectiveness and computational techniques are of
necessity married to each ether and to the military force-structure
planning ef the future.
As an instructional device, it is perhaps natural that the
game form which requires its participants to base their decisions
on overall dynamics ef cost-effectiveness comparisons ef competing
weapon systems and uncertain actions ef the enemy should be used to
reflect the true spirit ef systems analysis. A gams ef this type
is intended to provide a simulated environment and a conceptual
frame work within which to generate principles and concepts. Its
prime purpose is pro-analytical. It may help to stimulate research,
systematize issues, formulate problems more clearly, provide

an initiative, preliminary or gross evaluation ef alternative
strategies er instrumentalities; but it is net usually expected
te yield final answers.
In light ef the feregeing, TEMPO (Economic Analysis Section)
in 1961 developed a Military Planning Game to simulate the mili-
tary planning and decision process at the highest level in the
organization hierarchy. Its authors constructed the game so as
to permit insights to bo derived from the conditions of play.
The follow principles are intended to be found in the course of
play or in the post-game critique:
1. Current decisions must take future years Into
account. (Research and development actions imply
procurement and operating expenses In later years.)
2. Systems planning eaa only take place In the eontox
of total force-structure planning.
3. The relevant length of the planning horizon is the
Indefinite future.
4. Estimates of effectiveness, costs, and timing are
subject to considerable uncertainty - greater as the
time Increases between estimates and ths actual period.
5. Obsolescence - a continuously critical consideration
- is an Increasing function of time.
6. Hedging policies involving a balance of forces may
bo quite desirable in view of uncertainties regarding
future capabilities and intentions.
7. Because of budget constraints, technological progress
and enemy-actions decision making becomes a delicate art
which involves such contrasting considerations as the
following:
a. Older programs may never realize their expected

potential if newer and more promising ones are con-
tinually brought in to replace them.
b. Expenditures on marginal or submarginal programs
may be worthwhile if they force the enemy to expend
inefficiently a high enough proportion of resources
to counter them.
c. Too thin a program spread may prove inefficient,
and prevent fullest utilization of operational sys-
tems.
d. Certain generations of systems may have to be
skipped.
e. Unless a substantial dominance in resources or
planning is present, it is likely to be impossible
to maintain a* continuously leading position.
f
.
Delays in program implementation can lead to
reduction, of eventual utility.
8. Enemy actions should be systematically considered
and related to the confidence in one*s information on
his actions,
9. The over-all problem of long-range military plan-
ning is too complex to attack without the aid of models
and sophisticated research tools, (1]
This paper makes use of the TEMPO game frame-work to introduce
a Linear Programming Technique that can be used to derive "best"
feasible solutions under varying assumptions and thus serves to
further demonstrate the effects of the principles listed above.
It should be noted, at this point, that the TEMPO game is
a significant departure from reality in that each team starts
with an identical force structure and has the opportunity to de-
velope the same weapons throughout the play of the game. There-
fore the Linear Programming Technique and a particular "best" feasible

selutien hare value enly as a teal ta illustrate the dynamic
quant itat Ire aspects #f "aysteas analysis" and what happens whea
ana tries ta gat the aest far hia aeney wlthia a set frame af
censtraints. 1% it quite lapertant te kaap ia alad that la tha
werld af reality subjective reasening mat ba applied te aceeunt
far these areas af a preblea which can mat ba quantified ar whara
uncertainty deainates tha assuaptieas aade, ia erder ta arrive
at " a selutien ". Tha analytical taala are intended ta as • let
a decisienaaker by beunding these parts af tha preblea that caa
ba ae treated aad that narrewing tha range wlthia which " a fea-
aible selutien " exista. It is heped that frea tha cat af fea-




TEMPO 1 s Military Planning Game is played by two teams,
which commence play with identical pre-specified force structures
and defense budgets and each team has a choice of the same set of
strategies. Thus the game is of the zero-sum, symmetric type.
The force structure is composed of two types of offensive
systems identified here as 1 and 2 and two types of defensive sys-
tems identified here as 3 and 4* Defensive system 3 is only
effective against offensive system 1 and like wise 4 is only ef-
.}
fective against 2.
Each of the afore mentioned systems is composed of various
weapons. Bach weapon is characterized by :
a. having a specific number in inventory ( operated or pro-
cured the previous year)
b. operating cost ( annual )
c. procurement cost/time phase and limit ( one time cost
with a limit number of units that can be procured in one
period to be operated in the following period )
d. R&D cost and time phase ( annual R&D cost, time de-
pending upon the number of periods over which the R & D is
spread. Procurement of the weapon can not commence until
the last period of R & D)

e. utility value, (military worth)
The payoff is determined by the net effective offensive
utility differences of the two teams.
A team's effective offensive utility value is found by
taking the sum of the amounts by which its two offensive system
utility values exceed the utility values of the oppositing team's
defensive systems, (Note: Over defending has zero effect on
payoff.) The game is played with a known probability of war.
If war occures in one period, the budget of the team with least
effective offensive utility value is docked in the subsequent
period by the amount of the payoff. Total game payoff is summed at
the end of the completed game.
At the beginning of each time period (year), each team makes
a move (selects a strategy) constrained by a fixed current budget
(only the trend of the future budget is known), the previous periods
inventory and procurements, procurement limitations and new weapon
availability via R&D. Each team draws upon the following quan-
titative or quasi-quantitative factors to compose their particular
force mix.
a. They consider the relationships between R&D, procurement
and operating cost, utility value and the system in which the
weapons are designed to operate. Exact relationships are
known at the time of the last R&D period and fixed therafter,
until this point a degree of uncertainty exists.

b» Intelligence procured in prior periods as to the force
structure of the opponent.
c. Probability of war, which is known.
The teams submit their force mixes, a die is cast, if war is
found to occur during that period the appropriate team's subsequent
year budget is reduced by the amount of the payoff, if not each
team is given the same fixed next period budget, intelligence in-
formation (if procured), weapon factor changes (for those in early
R&D phases) and possiblly new weapons maybe introduced. The
game continues thus until a predetermined (but unknown to the
players) number of time periods have been played. Then, the post-
4-
game critique enters to bring out the principles of "system Analysis"




The TEMPO game solution, in general, is one where limited
assets vary with time and the manner in which previously held
assets were expended and where each team desires to maximize a
total effect at the end of a specified or assumed time. It is
a problem in resource allocation over time with all its aspects
of cost-effectiveness. * An attempt to discuss such problems in
general would be presumptuous here; but the problem of resource
allocation in the TEMPO game will be treated here making use of
variations in linear programming techniques, in model form, to
present some methodology and, it is hoped, some concepts which
will be useful in dealing with or illustrating cost as related
to measures of effectiveness. The game is of the zero-sum,
symmetric type, in that each team starts with identical force
structures and has available a choice of the exact same strate-
gies to play under the same payoff rules. The payoff matrix is
symmetric with zeroes down the diagonal. A "best" solution for
one is also "best" for the other, so from here en we will treat
the problem from one team's point of view, realizing that it also
applies to the other team equally well.
1. Force allocation model — 1
Given a weapon systems structure, including weapon types,
8

costs, time phasing, and expected budget levels, the Force-allo-
cation Model will determine the force mix over time which will
give the maximum effectiveness for the fixed expected period
budgets* Given actual or assumed weapon characteristics, a
program determines the number of each weapon required in each
time period to accomplish maximum cost-effectiveness, subject to
the particular games constraints of dollars, procurement level,
system mix, etc.. «
The procedure by which the preferred force mixes are calcu-
lated is based upon the fact that all the necessary characteristics
of the problem can be expressed in terms of linear functions of
the number of weapons in the inventory at any time.
The problem is to determine the force-mix which will maximize
the objective function V^ - Total Utility Value which equals the
sum of each operating weapon times its utility value summed over
the entire period of play
K (I J
V>y~! X>frjk»Uljki +Yj*ijk. Uljk




wijk • coi * Pijk • Cpi * aik ^ \ for j - 1,2, J (2)
k - 1,2, K
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i s 1,2...... I = the number of different weapon available.
j s 1,2, J = the number of different weapon systems.
k s 1,2, K = the number of time periods.
W-jjk = the number of the i^n type weapon allocated to the j^h
system in the k^n period.
Ui1k= the utility value of the i*-n weapon, in the jtn system in
the ktn period.
P^k = the number of the i^n type weapon purchased in the k^n
period for use in the j^h system.
BJVj= the number of the i^n type weapon in inventory at the be-
ginning of a period of play.
LjlIc =- Purchase limit on the i
th type weapon in the k^n period.
C i •== Unit operating cost of the i^n type weapon.
Cpj_
= Unit purchase cost of the i^h ^ypa weappn.
CRik = R & D cost of the itn type weapon in the ktn period.
Bfc -= Actual or estimated budget for the k^n period.
R^k = the amount of R & D purchased in k^n period for weapon i.
pjjk^the asteriskdenotes that this weapon is a modification of
another existing weapon.
The objective function equation (l) is in a more general form
than called for by the game. In TEMPO'S game the O^'s are constants,
here the utility value of a weapon is a function of the system in
which it is used and time. Note also that the game uses a particular
11

weapon in only one system.
The set of equations given by equation (2) specifies that in
each time period total weapon R&D, procurement and operating
costs can not exceed the budget for that period. Note that the
model does not allow variation in the operating or procurement
cost with time, the use of learning curves on cost, or the intro-
duction of costs associated with disposal of weapons from inventory.
The set of inequalities given by equation (3) specifies the
initial inventory for oach weapon. Note that this set requires
only that the initial inventory have an upper bound, thus allowing
weapons to be removed from inventory if desirable.
Equation (4) is used to keep track of all non-purchasable
weapons. With the variable definition used, these relations
prevent the use of weapons in any future time period if they were
not used or procured in the previous period. The equation also
keeps track of those weapons which are modified into another
weapon P.
Equation (^) defines the purchase constraints on each weapon
as a function of time. It also is used to insure that the re-
quired periodic increments of R & D have been purchased. The set
is more general than called for by the game where the purchase
limit is a constant. However, in this way, the set can be used to
specify the nonavailability of particular weapons, but a better way
is not to define P for the weapon if no purchases are to be allowed.
12

Equation (6) specifies that the amount of R & D that can be
expended on a weapon in a particular period is predetermined.
Equation (7) specifies that the number of weapons that can
be modified is also limited by the number of operating weapons
available to modify.
Equations (8) and (9) specify that in each time period de-
fensive utility values of system 3 and U can not exceed the of-
fensive utility values of systems 1 and 2. Note, while this
eliminates the possibility of over defending for which there is
no payoff, it might also mean reduced total utility if a parti-
cular defensive weapon has a very high cost-effectiveness rela-
tive to the weapons of the opposing offensive system.
Equation (10), (11) and (12) state that the variables R, W
and P, R & D and the number of weapons operated, and procured,
are always positive or equal to zero.
The model as defined above will give a team the "best"
solution in the "greatest bang per buck" sense and is optimal
only under the assumption that the probability of war is zero,
and no intelligence exists about the opponent. However, the
game is played with a known probability of war and a penalty
payoff is imposed upon a losing team and intelligence can be
procured. The liklihood that the model will give a team the
maximum total utility decreases as the probability of war appro-
aches unity and intelligence received indicates that the opponent
13

is not using M best solutions. This serves to illustrate the
necessity of considering not only long run economy of effort but
also short run levels of effectiveness relative the opponents.
Said in another way, total long run efficiency may have to be sac-
rificed in order to hedge against the probability of war.
The model can be used to test the sensitivity of a pay-off
penalty being applied in a particular period simply by reducing
the amount of the expected budget for that period. It also can be
used to maximize the utility value at a particular period. In the
process of doing this, it identifies the time-span critical R&D,
investment and operating path.
2. Model modification — 1
In order to bring in intelligence information and subjective
reasoning equations (2), (8) and (9) can be replaced by the following
equation:
sh* BJk (13)coi pijk • Cpi * Rijk • cRik
i*l
Where
B.. = Estimated budget of the jtn system in time period k.
This equation will allow a team to constrain the amount of funds that
can be expended on a particular system in each time period and thus
apply selective subjective weighting into the model.
H

3. Model modification — 2
The game and model as presently designed allow a particular
weapon to operate in only one system with a constant utility value.
Equation (3), (k) and (5) can be modified to:
J
,




(V (k-1) pij (k-1) + P?j (1
*
for i * 1,2,—-I
k = 1,2,—-K
£<*ik p JRik~== Lik







Pijk ^Wijk for i = 1,2,-1, J = 1,2,—J (7a )
k = 1,2, K, i of P / i of If
The above equations will further generalize the model to where any
weapon can be used in any system and since U is already in generalized
form, the game can be used to simulate the concept of tactics. This
adds another dimension to the play of the game which is easy to handle
here, however, it will considerably complicate manual play.
4. Model modification — 3
To illustrate the effect of a forced "budget stream" in the force-
structure in relation to level and total effectiveness over time,
15

equation (2) can be replaced by :




Bf = Total budget for K periods.
This equation relaxes the constraint of spending only a specified sum
in a particular period, thus allowing dollars to flow into periods
where an optimum payoff can* be achieved. Note while total effective
offensive utility will be greater than or at least equal to that ob-
tainable under equation (2), in some periods of play (early ones) the
effective utility maybe less. This serves to demonstrate that by
accepting a relative low level of effectiveness in the early periods
of weapons system development, a later stronger and cost wise more
efficient structure can evolve. Again here the probability of war
enters so one must, as discussed before, consider the level of effec-
tiveness in each particular period.
5. Force allocation model — 2
The TEMPO game could be modified so that the objective of the
game was to see which team could maintain a fixed effectiveness level
at minimum cost. For instructional purpose this would tend to empha-
size the other way to approach a "system analysis" problem — fix
the effectiveness level that you want to obtain and then vary the other
resources until a minimum cost mix is obtained.
16

The problem is to determine the force-mix which will minimize
the objective function C«p — Total cost for k periods which equals
the total operating, procurement and R&D cost of each weapon
employed during the period of play.
>i wljk • Col — +V WijkCoI i (15)Cm —
s
J I
Pljk • Cpi + — + XT pIjk • Cpi 1 VZ Rikj=l i-l
Subject to the following constraints :
I
2H Wijk = Vak for i = 1,2, — J (16)
i»l
k = 1,2, K
and also prior constraints (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (10), (11) and
(12).
where
Vjfc = The number of the jth type weapons required to equal
a specified utility value - 1*^ for the jtn system in
period k.
The set of equations given by Equation (16) specifies that in
each time period each system must have a utility value equal to some
predetermined amount - Vjk . As to the other constraints, the afore-
mentioned comments also apply here.
The model as defined above can be used to sence the effect of re-
quiring a specified military posture. The cost in each period, total
17

cost and the structure of the cost-time-stream are the interesting
relations to derive, compare and discuss in the light of particular





This chapter will display various solutions to a cut down
version of the Tempo game. The force structure which follows
is composed of eight weapons types, four weapon systems and is
played over a ten year period.
1. Weapon characteristics
Weapon Name I J U Co Cj> L
Flood 1 1 20 30 50 25
LeMay 2 1 500 150 250 15
Decker 3 2 40 50 70 25
Schriever 4 2 150 70 120 15
Vinson 5 3 50 60 100 25
Super-Vinson 6 3 80 80 50 25
Mahon 7 4 15 20 40 25
Lemnitzer 8 4 110 60 90 25
* Modifies existing Vinsori.
where
I = Weapon Number GP^ Procurement Cost
J = Weapon Syst,em L = Yearly Procurement Lii
U = Utility Value


















































Cr1 oo °Cr6 = R & D cost in 1st...6th period of play
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5. Force allocation model-1, (refer p. 8) Computed detail results.
Control Data's CDm2/Linear Programming System was used to
compute the following results. The system uses the Revised
Simplex method in which the inverse is in product form. It can
handle problems up to 200 row constraints and 599 column variables.
The game example presented here has 142 column variables with 187
row constraints. The computer running time was approximately
3 minutes.
Table I, force-mix gives an exact brake down as to which
weapons are operated - W, procured - P and R&D expenditure - R
during each period of play. Note that this particular solution
is in no way "intuitively obvious", but its trend is. The less
cost-effective weapons are gradually replaced with the more cost-
effective ones. In the case of weapon 8 it even pays to procure
3.8 units in period 7 to operate only during periods 8 and 9.
This result can be traced to the decreasing budget trend that com-
menced in the 7th period*
The utility values for each system, by year, their totals and
net offensive (payoff) are set down in Table - II. Note that the
weapons available to defensive system 3 are not cost-effective
after the second period of play. Total yearly utility decreases
in the second year, stays low in the third #aar and then rises to
a maximum in the last year. This result can be traced to the heavy
R&D investment in the early years. Procurements in the middle
21

years were taken care of by relatively higher budgets. In the
later years lower relative budgets were able to maintain high
utility value, due to the previously sunk R&D and procurement














































































































Year 1 2 3 4 Total
Net.
Off
1 1160 1600 1000 600 4360
•
1160
2 425 1675 425 600 3125 1075
3 1675 1675 3350
4 1950 1675 • 1675 5300 1950
5 3900 1810 1810 7520 3900
6 5850 1870 1870 9590 5850
7 6520 2250 2250 11020 6520
8 6520 4500 4500 15520 6520
9 6520 5700 4525 16745 76QS
10 6650 5700 4125 16745 8225
Total 39495 28455 1425 23630 93005 42895
24

6. Comparative solutions of
i ,
various modifications to the Basic
nOucjL 1
TABLE III
TOTAL UTILITY VALUES PER YEAR
Year A B C 2 § F G
1 4360 4260 4260 1550 4135
2 3125 2560 2560 1550 3230
3 3350 2750 2750 1550 2750 2750 3575
4 5300 6530 6530 3500 7450 7450 5490
5 7520 9520 9520 5450 12150 12150 7035
6 9590 11850 12925 7400 15125 15800 7890
7 11020 14725 15620 13640 i7375 18050 11100
8 15520 16900 16820 20310 19625 18050 13375
9 16745 17165 16470 21780 19625 18050 14355
10 16475 16315 15700 21780 14850 18050 14460
Total 93005 102570 103155 98510 108950 110350 84645
where
A =:The Basic Model (refer p. 8)
B "EEL The Basic Model with constraints (8) and (9) applied
only in the 10th period (refer p. 10)
C = The Basic Model without constraints (8) and (9)
D = Model modification — 3 (refer p. 15)
E = Model modification — 3 with constraints (8) and (9)
applied only in the 10th period
25

F = Model modification — 3 without constraints (8) and (9)
G = Model modification — 1 where system 1 and 2 were each
allocated 3/10 of each yearly budget and system 3 and
4 were allocated 2/10 (refer p. 14)
Since many relationships are involved, only a few explanatory
remarks concerning the data in Table - III will be made here.
First, comparing the Basic model - A with B (defensive system utility
value can not exceed comparable offensive system in the last period
of play) and C (no restrictions on defensive systems relative to
offensive) the total utility increases, as would be expected, when
going from A to B to C. The same results occure when going from
D to E to F with the total cost model. Also one would expect G to
have the lowest number of utility points since money is forced into
a system whether it is efficient or not. Total utility values of
D, E and F are greater than their respective counterparts A, B and
C due to the fact that the latter plays have a yearly budget rest-
riction and thus force spending on early weapons which yield less
utility per dollar. However, one should not over look the fact





NET OFFENSIVE UTILITY VALUES (PAYOFF)




1075 1560 1560 10 1560
10 270
1950 1950 1950 1960 1950 1950
3900 3900 3900 3910 3900 3900 1280
5850 5850 A625 5860 5850 5850 1920
6520. 6800 5070 8020 5850 5850 2630
6520 6800 5070 9750 5850 5850 4325
7695 6800 5070 11220 5850 5850 5445












Total 42895 42535 33475 51970 35100 35100 23940
In general the yearly trend of the net offensive utility values
(Table IV) follows an early period decline reaching a minimum in
the third year and then increasing to a maximum in the last year.
This is due to the same factors mentioned in the discussion of
Table II above. A result that is expected but not so obvious is
that net offensive payoff decreases as you proceed from A to B to
C and from D to E to F, while total utility (Table III) increases.
This is due to the existence of a defensive weapon that is more
cost-effective than any counterpart offensive weapon and the relax-
ing of the constraints applying to over-defending.
27

The maximum utility value that can be obtained in the 10th
period (total cost model, Model modification — 3 (refer p. 15))
a. with constraints (8) and (9) 31.127
b. with constraints (8) and (9) in 10th period 31.213
c. without constraints (8) and (9) 31.357
Force allocation model — 2, (refer p. 16) effectiveness
levels of 3,000 utility per year for systems 1 and 2 and 2,000
for system 3 and U were set. The minimum cost required to keep
this effectiveness level over the ten year period of play was
102,416 dollars. The ten year utility in this case was 100,000
points. When effectiveness was not held constant, approximately
100,000 utility points were obtained from a budget of 76,800
dollars. This clearly shows the price that must be paid to main«
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